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BOOK REVIEW
Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments-Questions (2d ed.). ROGER C.
CRAMTON, DAVID P. CURRIE & HERMA H. KAY. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 1975. Pp. lii, 1021. $18.50.
On Reading Cramton, Currie & Kay-Reflections and
Propheciesfor the Age of Interest Analysis
I shall not keep the reader in suspense. The second edition of
Cramton, Currie and Kay1 is a masterful piece of work. Even more
important than its brilliance is the intellectual honesty displayed by
the authors in confronting the difficult, if not impossible, questions
presented by interest analysis. The authors were, and I believe
remain, devotees of the mode of governmental interest analysis
developed and refined by the late Professor Brainerd Currie.2
From the first page to the last, the casebook bears the mark of his
sharp and uncompromising questions, which penetrate and expose
the fallacies not only of traditional doctrine, but also those of the
more modern efforts to rescue the old doctrines by dressing them
up in more fashionable clothing.3
The authors, however, do not reserve the tough questions for
the enemy camp alone. With brutal honesty the authors have exposed the weaknesses and inconsistencies of their adopted doctrine
of interest analysis. A few of these rigorous questions, taken out of
context, are: "Is interest analysis merely a complicated way of saying
that the law of the domicile governs? ' 4 "Does the New York experience in automobile guest cases suggest that identifying the policies
1

R. CRAMTON, D. CURIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-

QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CRAMTON]. The first edition, published in
1968, was the work of two of the three authors, Roger C. Cramton and David Currie.
2 See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited
as SELECTED ESSAYS].
3 Professor Brainerd Currie and a broad range of other academic critics have strongly
criticized the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS for its compromising approach to
choice-of-law problems. See, e.g., Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
DUKE L.J. 1, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra, note 2, at 690; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 275 (1971); Baade, Marriage and Divorce In American
Conflicts Law: Governmental-InterestsAnalysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV.
329 (1972); Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" In the Conflicts Law of Torts--Law
and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963); and Sedler,
The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 279 (1972).
4 CRAMTON 245.

1045

1046

CORNELL LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 61:1045

underlying the relevant law may not be feasible?" 5 "Is a more
refined or exact definition of policy required for conflict than for
domestic cases?"'6 "How do you determine who is entitled to the
protections or burdens of a particular law?"'7 "Was Currie right in
dismissing so lightly the forum shopping problem?" 8 "If interest
analysis has no answer to true-conflict cases what good is it?" 9
The authors constantly challenge the reader to rethink his position. After presenting several approaches to a conflicts problem,
Cramton, Currie, and Kay frequently persuade the reader that none
of the approaches is satisfactory. This is because a hypothetical case
can always be invented in which application of the approach would
defeat its avowed purposes. Consequently, one is moved by the
futility of all these brilliant theories to say, "A plague on all your
houses!" And yet the authors make clear that the clock cannot be
and consequences of
turned back to the time when the purposes
0
choice-of-law rules went unexamined.'
Where does all this leave us? Except for a few zealots who have
perceived "the truth" and thus view the slightest deviation from
Brainerd Currie's thinking as heresy, the interest analysis camp (and
despite my territorialist views, I number myself among them)" is in
disarray. The tough questions posed by the casebook have pitted
territorialist considerations against pure interest analysis. 1 2 There is
no doubt in my mind that in the reconciliation of these two concepts
lies the "tomorrow" of choice-of-law. The work will have to be
accomplished in the world of scholarship posthaste. Failure to do so
5 Id. at

251.
6 Id. at 253.
7 Id. at 254.
8 Id. at 271.
9 Id. at 275.
10 This does not mean that it may not be possible to formulate rules or principles of
preference which give guidance to the resolution of a choice-of-law problem. See D. CAVERS, THE CHoIcE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965). Such rules or principles will, however, proceed
from an examination of the interests and policies behind the supposedly conflicting rules.
Care will have to be taken that such rules are not overly broad and that the particular fact
pattern fits within the intendment of the rules. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 30-32;
A. TWERSKI, A

"I As

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ II(F) (1976).

a matter of personal privilege, I disagree with the casebook's characterization of
me as a rulist. CRAMTON 7. As will become clear in this review, I have strong territorialist
leanings, but I also have rather strong objections to rules created for the sake of rules. See
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV. 104, 105
(1973).
12 "Pure" interest analysis looks solely to the state policies that underlie a particular
law. Territorialists tend to emphasize the geographical and temporal contacts of the controversy with the jurisdiction whose law is to be applied.
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will lead to decisions fashioned in the mold of Neumeier v. Kuehner,13
or worse.
Thus, the second edition of Cramton, Currie, and Kay gives
cause for both celebration and sombre reflection. Celebration-for it
is always a time for rejoicing when sharp scholarly conflict is set forth
with clarity and honesty. But sombre reflection in the recognition
that unless there is a fundamental reconciliation of territorialist and
interest analysis thinking, the lifetime work of some of the most
innovative legal thinkers of our time will ultimately be disregarded.
As priceless an item as this book is, I hazard the prophecy that the
third and certainly the fourth editions will be very different. It will
be an either-or proposition. Either the synthesis between territorialist thinking and interest analysis will be forthcoming, or else
we will be presented with a new hodgepodge of narrow jurisdictionselecting rules created for the sake of convenience and devoid of any
consistent jurisprudential base. This vital and vibrant area of law
could turn into a "dismal science."
I
TERRITORIALISM VERSUS INTEREST ANALYSIS

Rather than lead the reader through a bland chapter-bychapter whodunit which will leave no one the wiser, I should like to
take serious issue with the authors on one of the major problems
facing interest analysts. The thrust of my remarks will be directed
toward the position taken by the authors in chapter two of the
casebook. This chapter was the major focus of revision and led to the
publication of the second edition. It reflects the polarity that infects
and affects the scholars and the uncertain reaction of the courts to
interest analysis in the post-Babcock era. 14 It is clear that the authors
are concerned with the role of interest analysis in those cases in
which the governmental interests point toward the application of
one state's law, while the entire territorial fact pattern points toward
applying the law of the state where the facts developed.' 5 The
authors are, at times, on the verge of giving grudging recognition to
territorial considerations but shrink from the challenge.' 6 Even if
party expectations are not a factor in determining conduct, should
13

31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). The authors have pre-

sented a range of opinions on the troublesome results in Neuneier. CRAMTON 352-59.
14 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
15 See CRAMTON 289-96, 334-52, 354.
16 Id.
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they not figure into the interest analysis calculus? The authors chastise the territorialists by asking whether we believe public opinion
polls should be used to determine applicable law.' 7 In a perceptive
question directed toward my position that territorial considerations
are often compelling, 18 the authors ask whether territorial considerations do anything more than lead us back to the contact counting
that pervaded the Auten' 9 and Haag2 ° decisions. 2 1 Having been
slapped with the white glove of two gentlemen and a gentlelady
adversary,22 I relish the opportunity for a duel.
In responding to these questions, I shall first pose several of my
own. I believe it can be demonstrated that even the most ardent
advocate of interest analysis must ultimately come to terms with the
territorial dilemma. Indeed, if my questioning is successful we may
even find a rather substantial dose of territorialism in Brainerd
23
Currie's work.
Territorial dimensions of the fact pattern before the court

A.

Let us turn then to Haag v. Barnes.2 4 Haag was a support action
on behalf of an illegitimate child. The child was conceived in New
York as a result of sexual relations between defendant Barnes, an
Illinois lawyer, and plaintiff Haag, a New York legal secretary who
worked for the defendant during his frequent business trips to New
York. After learning of the pregnancy, Ms. Haag went to California
to live with her sister and await the birth of the child. Haag then
became apprehensive that Barnes was losing interest in her, so she
travelled to Chicago. Upon arriving in Chicago, she was instructed
by Barnes's attorney to choose a Chicago hospital for the child's
birth; she was also told that Barnes would pay the expenses. Shortly
after the child was born, the parties executed a support agreement
in Chicago which provided that Barnes would pay $275 a month
until the child was sixteen years old, in exchange for a release from
all future obligations. Haag also agreed to remain in Illinois with the
child for two years. The instrument stipulated that Illinois law governed the agreement. Under Illinois law, such support agreements
1

Id. at 295.

18 Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9

L. REV. 373 (1971).
'9 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).

DUQUESNE

Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
342.
22 Id. at 282, 342.
23 See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
24 9 N.Y.2d 554, 174 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
20

21 CRAMTON
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releasing a parent from future support were valid if made for at
least $800. In New York, agreements by parents of an illegitimate
child were not binding unless approved by a court upon determination that adequate provision for the child had been made.
Ms. Haag returned to California with the consent of Barnes,
who released her from the contract provision requiring her to remain in Illinois. She lived there with her sister for two years and
then returned to New York. A year after returning to New York, she
attempted to upset the Illinois support proceeding. In a much
criticized decision by Judge Fuld, the New York Court of Appeals
held that Illinois law should govern because Illinois had the most
"significant contacts" with the case.15 In support of Illinois law the
following contacts were enumerated: (1) the intention of the parties
as expressed in the contract was that Illinois law governed; (2) the
contract was executed in Illinois; (3) both parties were designated in
the agreement as being of Chicago, Illinois; (4) the defendant's place
of business was Illinois; (5) the child was born in Illinois; (6) the
persons designated to act as agents for the principals were Illinois
residents; and (7) all contributions for support had been made from
Illinois. 26 The following New York contacts were held to be of less
significance: (1)the child and mother lived in New York at the time
27
of the action; and (2) part of the "liaison" took place in New York.
Professor Currie's analysis of Haag is one of the most logically
compelling arguments that I have ever read. He demonstrated not
only that the "most significant contact" approach is foreign to interest analysis, but also that it is destined to lead to irrational and
nonsensical results. 28 Why, Currie asks, should contacts such as the
defendant's place of business, the place where the child was born,
and the intention of the parties or their physical locus when they
signed the support agreement, be determinative of whether Ms.
29
Haag should recover additional support for her illegitimate child?
New York, the forum in this case, has a clear and well-established
policy: agreements lacking judicial approval that attempt to establish
the support rights of the child are prohibited because the state seeks
"to secure the welfare of the child and ultimately to protect the
community against the contingency of the child's becoming a public
25 Id. at 560, 175 N.E.2d at 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
26
27
28

Id. at 559-60, 175 N.E.2d at 443-44, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
9 N.Y.2d at 560, 175 N.E.2d at 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
SELECTED EssAYs, supra note 2, at 727-39. See also Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard"In the

Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 498 (1962).
29

SELECTED EsSAYS, supra note 2, at 732-33.
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charge. '30 The New York interest, Currie argues, remains unaffected by such irrelevancies as the locus of the signing, the child's
place of birth, and the defendant's place of business. Even the
intention of the parties should not be considered by the New York
court, because the litigated issue is whether a mother may sell out
the child's statutory birthright to adequate support and simultaneously place the state in the position of bearing the burden of supporting the child. 3 1 If New York does not concern itself with the
mother's intent, it should not permit her to affect the welfare of both
the child and the community merely because there are Illinois con32
tacts in a conflicts case.
Professor Currie concludes that there was indeed a conflict
between the policies of the two states. New York, by requiring prior
judicial approval of such settlement agreements, seeks to protect the
child at the expense of the father's ability to end his paternal obligation. Illinois, by permitting such agreements without any form of
judicial approval, fosters the rights of fathers to freely contract away
paternal obligations, thereby severing his responsibilities to the child
forever. These policies are in irreconcilable conflict in this case and
there the matter must end. If the interests are as Currie has identified them, then no conflict of laws methodology which involves the
balancing of state interests can conclusively resolve the policy
conflict between the two states. 33 There is accordingly no reason why
New York should not apply its own law.
Up to this point the analysis is vintage Currie, but then Currie
does a turnabout and exposes a raw nerve:
We have established, I think, that only two relationships [residence of the mother and father] between the respective states and
the parties, the events, and the litigation need be taken into account in order to formulate a definition of governmental interests
that each state might reasonably make. It does not follow, of course,
that no other facts or relationships can be relevant in the court's
actual definition of those interests. A court inclined to define local
interests with moderation and restraint might with justification
take other circumstances into account. For example, it would not be
unreasonable to distinguish between the Haag case and one in which the
New York mother-to-be travels to Illinois and there seduces the man.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732-33.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 184. Currie states: "If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in
the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state
also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should apply the
law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest."
30

31
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Possibilities need not be multiplied. The point is that in defining
the scope of New York's interest in the parties and the events the
circumstances given weight must derive their significance from
limitations that
can reasonably be placed on the reach of New
34
York's policy.
It is not my intention to point to the inconsistency between the
Currie position that interests are not to be weighed or balanced, and
his position that courts can indulge in a moderate and restrained
interpretation of their own forum's statute by taking into account
the policies of other states. The authors of the casebook have attacked this contradiction with vigor and have indicated their belief
that the Currie position on this point is hardly defensible.3 5 I am
instead fascinated by a different aspect of his discussion. Having
identified the interests of the two competing states, Currie raises a
most difficult question-What if afemmefatale decides to leave New
York and go to Chicago and there seduce the Chicago lawyer?
Would New York then read its support statute to reach this situa36
tion? Currie suggests that it need not.
Here I believe Currie has posed the irreconcilable problem for
true advocates of interest analysis. The interest of New York, as
defined by Currie, is to protect the welfare of the child and the
community against the abandonment of the father and inadequate
support. As long as the interest remains intact (and it does so remain
as long as the mother's connections with New York are strong
enough that she intends to return there), there seems to be no
rational reason for New York to disclaim an interest in the outcome
of the support arrangement. Yet, here Currie suggests that New
York, by a "restrained and moderate interpretation" of its own law,
could find that it need not seek to have its own law apply to a New
York seductress who has temporarily established her base of operations in Illinois.3 7 Why not? What interest of New York in the
welfare of the child has been diminished? Is New York any less likely
to have to shoulder the burden of support? Is it even plausible to
argue that Barnes permitted himself to be seduced on the reliance
that if any child should be born of the union he would be able to free
34
35
36

Id. at 734-35 (second emphasis added).
CRAMTON 289-90.
Although Currie suggests that in this hypothetical case a New York court might

construe its statute so that it does not reach this fact pattern, (see text accompanying note
39 infra), at an earlier point in this discussion of Haag, Currie chastises Judge Fuld for listing
as a contact that "part of the 'liaison" "took place in New York. SELECTED EsSAYS, supra fiote 2,
at 734.
37 See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. OHi. L. REV.
1 (1959), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 361.
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himself of his obligations to it? Now, I ask the question: If Illinois
law is to be considered applicable in this case, is it because a public
opinion poll conducted on State and Madison Streets has revealed
that most Illinois residents expect Illinois law to govern because so
many of the events took place in Illinois? Indeed, was Professor
Currie a closet territorialist?
The dilemma is real. The state interests, once defined under
classic interest analysis, remain constant. Even major shifts in the
geographical nexus of the fact patterns rarely upset those interests.3 8 You and I know why the New York court would be reluctant to impose on an Illinois father who never left Illinois, the rule
subjecting all support agreements to the scrutiny of a New York
court. It seems patently unfair to tell a party who has acted only
within his home state that he is to have visited upon him the law of
another state with which he has had no contact whatsoever. Whether
one terms this consideration "unfair surprise" or "expectations" it
amounts to the same thing. The fact pattern is so heavily dominated
by one state that our sense of justice says that it is fair for that state's
law to govern. Another state's governmental interest may have to
take a back seat to territorialism.
Once territorialism is taken into account, perhaps Judge Fuld's
decision in Haag is tolerable, if not sensible. Certainly, the father of
the child had substantial contacts with New York. While in New
York, he became involved in an illicit sexual relationship. This may
be significant according to the Currie analysis set forth above. However, from that point the scenario shifted significantly away from
New York. Ms. Haag, though technically remaining a domiciliary of
New York, undertook a series of actions that gave the case a heavy
Illinois orientation. Her pursuit of Barnes to Chicago, the agreement to keep the child in Illinois for two years, and the sojourn to
California undertaken only with the permission of the father, evidence a major shift of events to Illinois. Using territorialism I would
38 Compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1973), with Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d. 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). Each case involved
a suit between an automobile passenger and driver who were New York domiciliaries. Babcock
arose from an accident which occurred during a weekend sojourn into Ontario. In Tooker, the
parties had resided in Michigan as students for several months before the accident, which
occurred in Michigan. The Court defined New York's policy in both cases as permitting New
York plaintiffs to recover against New York insurance companies, and refused to apply the
Ontario and Michigan host-guest immunity statutes. These cases demonstrate that although
the territorial nexus of a fact pattern may shift significantly from one case to another, devotees
of interest analysis might continue to resolve the case in a self-same manner, while territorialists would recognize such a change as justifying application of the law of the other
jurisdiction.
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not, on these facts, have held that Illinois law should apply, but I do
not find such a result to be irrational.
The failure to consider the territorial dimensions of a conflicts
case can also lead to constitutional problems of inordinate complexity. 39 Under classic interest analysis, the state interest that is to be
furthered by a particular statute might be defined in a discriminatory manner. For example, the policy underlying the statute of
frauds might be characterized by a court as being for the protection
of domiciliaries who contract within the state.4 ° Yet it would be
dearly unconstitutional for a state to treat non-domiciliaries differently from citizens of that state, by denying non-domiciiaries the
opportunity to plead the statute of frauds as a defense to suits
arising from contracts allegedly made within the state. 4 1 If a ter:9 Constitutional problems were directly confronted in Brainerd Currie's landmark article, Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict-of Laws: Privileges and
Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 445.
40 In Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651 (1935), a Delaware plaintiff
sought to enforce an option contract against a New York defendant. The contract was
enforceable under New York law, but unenforceable under Delaware law-that State's statute of frauds required an agent's authority to be in writing. The Delaware court considered whether it should label its statute of frauds "substantive" or "procedural" for
choice-of-law purposes, and found it "substantive" in order to afford "the greatest measure
Id.
I... at 487, 178 A. at 655. The court apparently concluded
of protection ... to its citizens .
that Delaware residents would more often be sued in out-of-state courts on commercial
contracts made in Delaware, than they would be sued in Delaware on contracts made in other
states.
By applying interest analysis techniques, Currie demonstrates that using place of making rules to accomplish the policy of protecting Delaware domiciliaries will lead to anomalous results. Delaware defendants will not be protected when they contract out of state,
although out-of-state defendants could plead the Delaware statute of frauds so long as the
contract was made in Delaware. If the defendant hails from a state that does not have a
statute of frauds, invalidation of the contract would foster the interest of neither state.
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 450-55.
41 Currie considers whether the constitutional problem could be met by giving the
out-of-state defendant the benefit of his domiciliary law or the Delaware law, whichever
affords the lesser protection. Under such a scheme, the out-of-state defendant would be
getting no greater protection than Delaware affords its residents (thus assuring that the
Delaware interest is met) and no lesser protection than granted by his own domiciliary law
(thus preventing unconstitutional discrimination). The defendant would not be discriminated against merely because he is an out-of-state resident. If he is not protected it is
because the law of his domicile did not see fit to grant him protection equal to that of
Delaware citizens. Although Currie flirts with this idea, he ultimately rejects it:
An argument can be made ... that the dominant policy of Delaware is to vindicate the expectations of promisees, and that the protective policy is a limited exception for local defendants. But the argument does not carry, in this context, the
conviction that it carries when the protective policy is directed toward special
categories of persons who are thought to be unable to protect themselves; here the
protected category is residents of the state in general.
Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 507 (emphasis added). Currie concludes that since
the Delaware statute of frauds is not written for a select group of Delaware defendants, no
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ritorialist rather than interest analysis approach is employed, these
constitutional problems disappear. For a territorialist, the answer is
that a statute of frauds may govern situations that are so closely
connected with a given territory that it becomes correct for the state
to seek to impose its law to govern the situation. I prefer to call, this
close type of nexus an "interest" which deserves recognition on par
with those suggested by the interest analysts. The right of a state to
apply its own law (here the. statute of frauds) to a situation which is
within the state seems to make fundamental
so heavily centered
42
good sense.
The Impact of Territorialism upon the Concept of "State Interest"
We now must come to grips with the underlying question-Are
the territorial considerations, that even Currie admits may have an
impact on choice-of-law resolution,4 3 to be dealt with only as a check
on pure interest analysis, or are these considerations fundamental to
a rational evaluation of state interests? Professor von Mehren, in a
recent article scrutinizing the various choice-of-law methodologies,4 4
B.

harm is done if the out-of-state defendant from a state that does not have a statute of
frauds is given greater protection than that afforded him by his home state.
It is true that no policy of [his home state] is thereby advanced; but on the other hand
it would be difficult to spell out a legal policy on the part of Delaware of protecting
the resident plaintiff when the domestic statute has not been satisfied. At all events,
here again we resolve doubts in favor of the constitutional policy against discrimination; the [out-of-state] defendant in this situation should be given the same "privileges and immunities" that are enjoyed by residents of Delaware under the Statute of
Frauds, and this whether the rejected classification be conceived in terms of citizenship or of residence.
Id. at 508.
This convoluted argument indicates the price to be paid when territorial considerations are totally pushed aside when undertaking interest analysis. The upshot of Currie's
argument, that the privileges and immunities clause demands that a contract be invalidated
even though there is no state that has a positive policy of invalidating the contract, strains
credulity.
There is a rational explanation for this dilemma, which Currie did not pursue. The
implications would have been devastating for his brand of interest analysis. It should be noted
that Currie suggests that the Delaware statute of frauds is not merely protective of a special
category of persons, but it is rather for "residents of the state in general." Id. at 507. If the
Delaware statute of frauds is not merely for the protection of Delaware defendants, and if it
cannot be a plaintiff-protecting rule (because if the statute of frauds is a defense to be pleaded
and proved by the defendant), then how can it be for "residents of the state in general"? I do
not believe that Currie's analytical framework provides a satisfactory answer to this question.
42 For a similar analysis, see Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24
N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969); and Twerski, Choice-of-Law In
Contracts-Some Thoughts on the Weintraub Approach, 57 IOwA L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1972). See
also Cavers, Oral Contracts To Provide By Will and the Choice-of-Law Process: Some Notes on
Bernkrant, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAw-EsSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 38, 60 (1964).
43 SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 690.
44 Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927
(1975).
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appears to argue that the territorial considerations that he describes
as the "comprehensibility" factor in a choice-of-law case, stand in
direct opposition to the kind of domestic interest analysis advocated
by Currie. 45 Perhaps the question is merely one of semantics, but I
believe the problem is fundamental. With all the vaunted sophistication of interest analysis, inadequate attention has been paid to the
identification and definition of states's interests. In another forum, I
attempted to demonstrate that the "time-space" dimensions of a
conflicts case are important in helping to determine the scope of a
state's interest in having its law applied.4 6 This has not, however,
been the approach adopted by the courts.4 r
In the rush to adopt interest analysis, the courts were faced
with identifying a methodology for determining interests. The
most obvious methodology came to the fore: looking to the original legislative or judicial policy behind a particular law. Thus, automobile host-guest statutes were designed to prevent collusion
between friendly parties against insurance companies, 4 8 state laws
against loss of consortium were designed to protect defendants
from ephemeral claims, 4 9 and rules establishing the incapacity of
parties to contract were to protect the helpless or hapless from
50
their own incompetence.
These attempts to equate a statutory or common-law rule
with the policy that brought the rule into existence make for shallow jurisprudence. 5 1 Let me illustrate. The case for discussion,
4'

See id. at 945.

46 Twerski, supra note 18.

47 But see Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970), where the court
asserted that
[i]nhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of liability exceeding that
created by their state's law just because a visitor from a state offering higher protection decides to visit there. This is, of course, a highly territorial approach ....
Id. at 567, 267 A.2d at 856-57.
4' See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
49 Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Ore. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
50 Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Law Method, 25 U. CH. L.
REv. 227 (1958), reprinted in SELECrED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 77.
51 For a more inclusive definition of state interests see Ratner, Choice of Law: Interest
Analysis and Cost-Contribution,47 S. CAL. L. REV. 817 (1974), in which the following mode of
analysis is suggested:
Identification of such underlying policies focuses not on the motives or intentions of legislators who enacted the statute or of judges who developed the common law rule but on community purposes or goals as disclosed by the problems
that evoked the rule, its function in the network of existing community arrangements, and the beneficial consequences to the community of its implementation. A community has an interest in the application of its rule to achieve the community benefits
that How from such application.
Id. at 819 (emphasis in original).
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Reque v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.,5 2 is a standard first
semester torts case illustrating the limitations of the negligence
per se principle. 53 The fundamental issue is: under what circumstances does violation of a prohibitory statute give rise to a
cause of action in favor of parties injured as a result of that violation? Plaintiff was injured when she stepped off a bus and fell to
the ground. The claim of negligence was bottomed on a statute
requiring all buses to stop within one foot of the curb. Because
the bus was illegally stopped, the plaintiff claimed that the negligence of the defendant bus company caused her injury; had the
bus stopped closer to the curb she would not have fallen. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the claim, following the wellestablished rule that in order to make out a case of negligence per
se the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by
the statute, and the harm must be the kind against which the statute
was intended to protect. 54 In this instance, the intent of the
legislature was to require buses to stop within one foot of the curb
to avoid obstructing traffic; the statute was not passed for the
convenience of alighting passengers. Thus, the plaintiff was denied
recovery because the statutory standard did not cover the particular
harm sustained.
My guess is that a good interest analyst would say that Wisconsin had an interest in buses stopping close to the curb to accommodate traffic but had no interest in protecting passengers
getting off too far from 'the curb. I believe that this kind of interest analysis is myopic. The error is fundamental. It may well be
that were it not for the problem of buses blocking traffic, the
legislature would never have passed the statute for the convenience of passengers. But once the statute is in effect, passengers
may expect to alight from a bus onto the curb. If this is so, then it
may be a harm that the statute has come to protect even though it
was not the original focus of the statute. Or better yet, it may be a
cause of action the statute has brought into existence.
Another example of this phenomenon arises from my favorite energy crisis hypothetical. As we all know, speed limits on
superhighways were reduced to 55 m.p.h. to congerve energy. In
my hypothetical, defendant, while driving at 65 m.p.h. on the
Pennsylvania Turnpike, has a blowout and loses control of his car,
which then careens over the median strip and collides with a car
52 7 Wis. 2d 111, 97 N.W.2d 182 (1959).
53 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §

-4 7 Wis. 2d at 114b, 97 N.W.2d at 183.

36 (4th ed. 1971).
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coming in the opposite direction. I have been careful to exclude
from this hypothetical any reliance by drivers in the defendant's
lane on the 55 m.p.h. limit. Does the 55 m.p.h. speed limit set a
standard for safety? There can be little question that the reduction in speed limit would not have occurred but for the energy
crisis. Should the reduced speed limit be dispositive of the case if
it is determined that a car traveling at the 55 m.p.h. limit could
have been brought under control thereby avoiding the accident? I
think that an affirmative answer is in order. For the first month
or two the statute was clearly viewed as energy-oriented, but, as
the reduced fatality statistics were revealed, subtle changes began
taking place in our thought patterns. People began thinking:
What is the rush? Is it really that important that another thousand
people be killed each year to get us to our destination ten minutes
faster?
Perhaps I have chosen some obvious examples, but I believe
the message is clear. If we are to understand the policies behind
common-law rules and statutes, we must look to effect as well as
causes. Law is a developing, pulsating reality which teaches and
molds societal values, and is in turn acted upon by society. It is not
a static, dead presence frozen into the policies and political pressures that brought it into existence. Given this perspective, it is
not at all clear to me that our present approach to interest
-analysis is adequate.
Erwin v. Thomas5 5 illustrates this problem in a conflict-of-laws
setting. Erwin was a Washington resident. He was injured in
Washington by the negligent operation of a truck driven by
Thomas in the course of his employment. Thomas was an Oregon
resident and his employer was an Oregon corporation. The plaintiff, Erwin's wife, sought to recover damages for loss of consortium. Oregon, but not Washington, allows a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium. The Oregon court made the following
analysis:
Let us examine the interests involved in the present case.
Washington has decided that the rights of a married woman
whose husband is injured are not sufficiently important to cause
the negligent defendant who is responsible for the injury to pay
the wife for her loss. It has weighed the matter in favor of
protection of defendants. No Washington defendant is going to
have to respond for damages in the present case, since the defendant is an Oregonian. Washington has little concern whether
other states require non-Washingtonians to respond to such
'5 264 Ore. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
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claims. Washington policy cannot be offended if the court of
another state affords rights to a Washington woman which
Washington does not afford, so long as a Washington defendant
is not required to respond. The state of Washington appears to
have no material or urgent policy56or interest which would be
offended by applying Oregon law.
Having decided that Washington had no interest, the Oregon
court determined that Oregon had precious little interest whether
non-resident married women injured outside Oregon recovered
for loss of consortium. Since neither state had any interest, the
Oregon court felt that it should do "what comes naturally" and
apply Oregon law. Conflicts cogniscenti will recognize this case as
the "unprovided for" case or the "no policy" case that places a
court in a special kind of dilemma because no state law has a
claim to application. 57 I have indicated my disbelief in the proposition that in a common, interstate automobile accident a court
cannot find any law to apply. 58 Anyone, other than a law professor
who teaches conflicts, would find such a statement ludicrous. Indeed, in such cases it would seem that a public opinion poll might
be invaluable in bringing wild theoreticians down to earth. I
should like, however, to focus on the question raised by the Oregon court, 59 and emphasized by Cramton, Currie, and Kay when
they asked, "[w]as the policy of Washington affronted in Erwin v.
Thomas ... by Oregon's permitting a Washington wife to recover

damages for loss of consortium arising out of her husband's in60
jury in Washington caused by Oregon tortfeasors?"
There is some difficulty in tracing the rationale of the
Washington policy in denying recovery to wives for loss of consortium. Its origin most probably stems from the common-law rule
that a wife had no right to the services of her husband. Dean
Prosser asserts that:
As the social and legal inferior, she could not require him to
work for her, and she had at least no common law remedy for
deprivation of his society, intercourse and affections. He was
legally bound to provide for her and she was entitled to his
support; but any injury to him did not terminate that obligation, and the tortfeasor was
61 liable to the husband himself for
any loss of earning power.
56 Id. at 458-59, 506 P.2d at 496 (footnote omitted).
'7 For extensive discussion of the "unprovided for" case, see Symposium: Neumeier v.
Kuehner: A Conflict's Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 94 (1973).
" See Twerski, supra note 11, at 106-12.
59 264 Ore. at 458-59, 506 P.2d at 496.
60 CRAMTON 357.
6' W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 125 at 894 (footnote omitted).
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It is questionable whether the policy expressed by this rule protects defendants. But, even if that is conceded, the continued acceptance of the wife's disability to sue for loss of consortium was
based upon a belief that the consortium action would lead to double recovery and that it would encourage a multiplicity of actions
62
by other persons such as children, parents, and other relatives.
Indeed, its viability in Washington, in the face of a strong equal
protection argument against it, may be indicative of Washington's
conservatism on the issue of women's liberation.
To put all this in the term "defendant protecting" is simply
dishonest. Whatever the policy of Washington, it is not only a policy that protects defendants but also one which denies plaintiffs'
recoveries-that is the inevitable effect of a defendant protecting
policy. Sometimes it may be possible to clearly identify the policy
that supports the rule denying the plaintiff recovery, and express
that policy in what interest analysts would call an "anti-plaintiff'
interest. But it appears to be sheer nonsense to say that a state has
no interest in denying recovery to a plaintiff injured in her own
home state when that state's law denies recovery. As the state's
"contact" with the event in question becomes more substantial, the
state's policy for governing that kind of event takes on increasing
importance. We cannot look merely to the policy that brought the
rule into being as the sole determinant of state policy; we must
look to the effect of law on the society's expectations. In part,
what I am advocating can hardly be opposed by the interest
analysts, since they could not argue against a more sophisticated
form of interest analysis. And they would agree, I believe, that if
they have been looking superficially at state interests in certain
kinds of cases, then the process can only benefit from a sharpening of analytical techniques.
I believe, however, that there are definite limits to the analytical process of interest analysis. In the dogma of interest analysis,
there is a belief that if we look hard enough we can determine the
scope of a state's interest in cases with extraterritorial facts. The
commentators cry with anguish at the refusal of courts to spell out
the scope of their interests in these cases, 6 3 arguing that as the
final arbiters of state policy, the courts can and should tell us what
their policy is.
If a decade of interest analysis has taught us anything,
62 Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971).
63 See, e.g., Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neuneier v. Kuehner, 1
HOFSTRA L. REv. 150, 163 (1973).
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it is that courts are not being ornery or unkind when they refuse or
are unable to articulate their policies. The New York Court of
Appeals had no pat answer for the scope of the forum's interest in
Neumeier.64 If the court were to be altruistic and give the benefit of
New York law to an Ontario citizen injured in Ontario, it would have
needed a guide for its altruism. Looking as hard as it could, it found
no such guide in New York jurisprudence. What the court did find
was a fact pattern so heavily dominated by Ontario that the judges
could not wrench themselves from the conclusion that Ontario law
should apply. There was a deep belief that whatever the policy
behind Ontario law at the outset, it would be sheer arrogance to say
that Ontario law would not apply to an Ontario plaintiff injured in
his own backyard.
I would thus conclude that "territorialism" or "comprehensibility" are not merely checks on interest analysis. The effects of
law on society are so complex that when a given event is tied in
"time-space" dimensions to a given jurisdiction, it becomes almost
certain that the interests of that society are called into play in a
very significant way. Sometimes we can make out reliance interests
that affect conduct. However, as the example drawn from the tort
cases demonstrate, even where conduct is not affected by reliance
on the state's law, this law often has a compelling effect on
thought patterns of society. What was yesterday's false conflict
may become tomorrow's real conflict. For those who wish to indulge in that kind of analytical game of identifying the original
policy behind a law in order to decide cases, there is only the
admonishment that a theory so ephemeral is bound to result in
decisions lacking staying power. I prefer to recognize from the
outset the very real limitations that encompass the interest analysis
process itself.
II
PROCESS VALUES

AND THE SUBSTANTIVE-PROCEDURAL DICHOTOMY

For those who maintain steadfast belief in the analytical purity of interest analysis, I should like to suggest some reading that
is bound to shake up some rather firmly held conceptions. With
great care, the authors develop the thesis that the substantiveprocedural dichotomy in choice of law is fraught with great dangers.6 5 If State X is to apply State Y's law to a given event, and if
" Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y. 2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
See Twerski, supra note 11, at 112-115.
" CRAMTON 99-124.
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a procedural rule of State Y will effectuate the deliverance of the
State Y result, then unless there is a strong administrative policy
demanding the application of State X's law, State X should defer
to State Y, even for what might otherwise be denoted a "procedural" rule of State X. The argument is that "procedural" and
"substantive" are terms that should be viewed functionally. 66 In a
functional analysis we must concern ourselves with the impact of
the "procedural" rule on the result of the case. If the procedure
can affect the outcome and not seriously inconvenience the
forum, there is no reason to treat the procedural rule any differently than other "substantive" choide-of-law problems. The
forum state has little interest in applying its law, and the state
whose law would otherwise apply has a significant interest in the
application of its law. Indeed, this would appear to yield a false
conflict under interest analysis. If one reflects on this argument, it
is clear that when "procedure" is viewed in a functional setting it
ceases to be a distinct category. Each procedural rule must be
evaluated in terms of its impact on the ultimate outcome of the
lawsuit. If the impact is significant and the application of a foreign
procedural rule can be accomplished without overburdening the
administrative mechanism of the forum court, then forum law
should give way.
In a recent article, Professor Summers has taken a fresh look at
legal process (procedure) not as a functional tool for obtaining good
results but as process qua process. He argues that "a legal process
can be good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be
good not only as a means to good results, but also as a means of
implementing or serving process values such as participatory gover68
nance, procedural rationality, and humaneness.1
Professor Summers contends that we have placed inordinate
emphasis on process as a means for obtaining good results, while
very little emphasis has been placed on the intrinsic values to be
achieved by the legal process itself. Nothing short of a full recitation of Professor Summer's engaging thesis will do it justice. He
has, however, clearly identified a blind spot in our jurisprudential thinking. Its implicationis for the procedural-substantive dichotomy should be obvious. If we begin thinking of procedure
66

See generally R.

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 3; Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to

Substance and Procedure In the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813 (1963); and A. VON
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWs 615-18 (1965).
67 Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60
CORNELL

68

L. REV. 1 (1974).

Id. at 4.
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qua procedure as implementing a broad range of social values,
then we may have to reexamine the outcome-oriented approach
that now dominates our thinking.
I have not raised the question of process values as an isolated
point with which to needle the authors. Rather, I believe this issue
is indicative of the primitiveness of the jurisprudential thinking
that pervades interest analysis. Its simplistic approach to governmental interests is serious business, because if our identification of the interests is shallow the entire structure will fall.
III
JURISDICTION AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

The engaging choice-of-law chapters are followed by chapters
on jurisdiction and full faith and credit.6 9 These chapters force
the student to rethink traditional approaches in the light of the
cataclysmic changes in choice of law. 70 Here again we are not
spared the difficult questions. 7' It becomes painfully clear to the
student that interest analysis and jurisdictional thinking are still
not integrated. And when the student finds some sense of relief in
the cold rationalism of recognition practice under the full faith
and credit clause, that too is disturbed by the splendid chapter
demonstrating the sheer idiocy which controls recognition practice
72
in the area of domestic relations.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate strength of this superb casebook is that it does
not permit the student to escape the tough questions. The authors
'9 CRANITON 499-751.
70 Id. at 144-402.
7' See, e.g., id. at 526-27, where the authors examine the complex interface between

jurisdiction and choice of law through an analysis of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
They ask, "Why doesn't it violate constitutional limits on choice of law to apply Florida law to
invalidate in the 1950's a trust arrangement established in 1935 by a person who had no
connection with that state when the arrangement was made?... Is there any reason to impose
a higher threshold of expectation upon the jurisdictional issue than upon choice of law? Isn't
choice of law likely to be the more significant of the two issues?" Id. at 527.
In the chapter on recognition of judgments, Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202
(1933), is used to illustrate vexing problems in full faith and credit. They ask, for example,
"Why should Georgia's interest in terminating the father's obligation override South Carolina's interest in providing for his child?" Id. at 677.
The authors also tackle the "land taboo" issue from several perspectives. At one point
they ask the reader, "If a foreign land decree is not entitled to full faith and credit, does its
recognition on a comity basis deprive the losing party of property without due process of
law?" Id. at 712.
72 Id. at 752-848.
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whipsaw the reader and demand that he face them. They brilliandy utilize both extensive scholarly material and case materials
to accomplish this goal. They have a unique ability to capture the
essence of a lengthy scholarly work through appropriate excerpts
and pithy comments. The ne t result is that the student develops a
sense of sophistication that could not otherwise be so easily obtained. For any law professor facing the decision as to whether to
introduce students to conflict of laws through the Cramton, Currie, and Kay method, I can only suggest that you try it-you'll like
it. No-you'll love it.
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